Otherwise, the CA and proxy settings will not be used for the call
to the upstream token endpoint while performing the refresh. This
mistake was exposed by the TestSupervisorLogin integration test, so
it has test coverage.
- If the upstream refresh fails, then fail the downstream refresh
- If the upstream refresh returns an ID token, then validate it (we
use its claims in the future, but not in this commit)
- If the upstream refresh returns a new refresh token, then save it
into the user's session in storage
- Pass the provider cache into the token handler so it can use the
cached providers to perform upstream refreshes
- Handle unexpected errors in the token handler where the user's session
does not contain the expected data. These should not be possible
in practice unless someone is manually editing the storage, but
handle them anyway just to be safe.
- Refactor to share the refresh code between the CLI and the token
endpoint by moving it into the UpstreamOIDCIdentityProviderI
interface, since the token endpoint needed it to be part of that
interface anyway
- Requiring refresh tokens to be returned from upstream OIDC idps
- Storing refresh tokens (for oidc) and idp information (for all idps) in custom session data during authentication
- Don't pass access=offline all the time
- throw an error when prompt=none because the spec says we can't ignore
it
- ignore the other prompt params
Signed-off-by: Ryan Richard <richardry@vmware.com>
This will allow us to store custom data inside the fosite session
storage for all downstream OIDC sessions.
Signed-off-by: Margo Crawford <margaretc@vmware.com>
This was wrong, since you don't need a LoadBalancer to run the
impersonation proxy if you specify spec.service.type = "None" or
"ClusterIP" on the CredentialIssuer.
This change fixes a copy paste error that led to the impersonation
proxy signer CA being rotated based on the configuration of the
rotation of the aggregated API serving certificate. This would lead
to occasional "Unauthorized" flakes in our CI environments that
rotate the serving certificate at a frequent interval.
Updated the certs_expirer controller logs to be more detailed.
Updated CA common names to be more specific (this does not update
any previously generated CAs).
Signed-off-by: Monis Khan <mok@vmware.com>
Updated Roadmap to reflect the work on Supervisor token refresh for OIDC and LDAP/AD. Also changed ordering on Multiple IDP Support as we are seeing more user interest for this feature.
At debug level:
upstreamoidc.go:213] "claims from ID token and userinfo"
providerName="oidc"
keys=[at_hash aud email email_verified exp iat iss sub]
At all level:
upstreamoidc.go:207] "claims from ID token and userinfo"
providerName="oidc"
claims="{\"at_hash\":\"C55S-BgnHTmr2_TNf...hYmVhYWESBWxvY2Fs\"}"
Signed-off-by: Monis Khan <mok@vmware.com>
This change updates the kube cert agent to a middle ground behavior
that balances leader election gating with how quickly we load the
signer.
If the agent labels have not changed, we will attempt to load the
signer even if we cannot roll out the latest version of the kube
cert agent deployment.
This gives us the best behavior - we do not have controllers
fighting over the state of the deployment and we still get the
signer loaded quickly.
We will have a minute of downtime when the kube cert agent deployment
changes because the new pods will have to wait to become a leader
and for the new deployment to rollout the new pods. We would need
to have a per pod deployment if we want to avoid that downtime (but
this would come at the cost of startup time and would require
coordination with the kubelet in regards to pod readiness).
Signed-off-by: Monis Khan <mok@vmware.com>
This change updates our certificate code to use the same 5 minute
backdate that is used by the Kubernetes controller manager. This
helps to account for clock skews between the API servers and the
kubelets that are running the pinniped pods. While this backdating
reflects a large percentage of the lifetime of our short lived
certificates (100% for the 5 minute client certificates), even a 10
minute irrevocable client certificate is within our limits. When
we move to the CSR based short lived certificates, they will always
have at least a 15 minute lifetime (5 minute backdating plus 10 minute
minimum valid duration).
Signed-off-by: Monis Khan <mok@vmware.com>
CertificatesV1beta1 was removed in Kube 1.22, so the tests cannot
blindly rely on it anymore. Use CertificatesV1 whenever the server
reports that is available, and otherwise use the old
CertificatesV1beta1.
Note that CertificatesV1 was introduced in Kube 1.19.
This commit makes the following changes to the kube cert agent tests:
1. Informers are synced on start using the controllerinit code
2. Deployment client and informer are synced per controller sync loop
3. Controller sync loop exits after two consistent errors
4. Use assert instead of require to avoid ending the test early
Signed-off-by: Monis Khan <mok@vmware.com>
This makes it so that our service selector will match exactly the
YAML we specify instead of including an extra "kapp.k14s.io/app" key.
This will take us closer to the standard kubectl behavior which is
desirable since we want to avoid future bugs that only manifest when
kapp is not used.
Signed-off-by: Monis Khan <mok@vmware.com>
