This refactors the `UpstreamOIDCIdentityProviderI` interface and its implementations to pass ID token claims through a `*oidctypes.Token` return parameter rather than as a third return parameter.
Signed-off-by: Matt Moyer <moyerm@vmware.com>
We opened https://github.com/vmware-tanzu/pinniped/issues/254 for the TODO in
dynamicOpenIDConnectECDSAStrategy.GenerateToken().
This commit also ensures that linting and unit tests are passing again.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Keesler <akeesler@vmware.com>
This commit includes a failing test (amongst other compiler failures) for the
dynamic signing key fetcher that we will inject into fosite. We are checking it
in so that we can pass the WIP off.
Signed-off-by: Margo Crawford <margaretc@vmware.com>
We missed this in the original interface specification, but the `grant_type=authorization_code` requires it, per RFC6749 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.1.3).
Signed-off-by: Matt Moyer <moyerm@vmware.com>
- Also handle several more error cases
- Move RequireTimeInDelta to shared testutils package so other tests
can also use it
- Move all of the oidc test helpers into a new oidc/oidctestutils
package to break a circular import dependency. The shared testutil
package can't depend on any of our other packages or else we
end up with circular dependencies.
- Lots more assertions about what was stored at the end of the
request to build confidence that we are going to pass all of the
right settings over to the token endpoint through the storage, and
also to avoid accidental regressions in that area in the future
Signed-off-by: Ryan Richard <richardry@vmware.com>
Because we want it to implement an AuthcodeExchanger interface and
do it in a way that will be more unit test-friendly than the underlying
library that we intend to use inside its implementation.
This will allow it to be imported by Go code outside of our repository, which was something we have planned for since this code was written.
Signed-off-by: Matt Moyer <moyerm@vmware.com>
- To better support having multiple downstream providers configured,
the authorize endpoint will share a CSRF cookie between all
downstream providers' authorize endpoints. The first time a
user's browser hits the authorize endpoint of any downstream
provider, that endpoint will set the cookie. Then if the user
starts an authorize flow with that same downstream provider or with
any other downstream provider which shares the same domain name
(i.e. differentiated by issuer path), then the same cookie will be
submitted and respected.
- Just in case we are sharing the domain name with some other app,
we sign the value of any new CSRF cookie and check the signature
when we receive the cookie. This wasn't strictly necessary since
we probably won't share a domain name with other apps, but it
wasn't hard to add this cookie signing.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Richard <richardry@vmware.com>
We want to run all of the fosite validations in the authorize
endpoint, but we don't need to store anything yet because
we are storing what we need for later in the upstream state
parameter.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Richard <richardry@vmware.com>
- When two different Issuers have the same host (i.e. they differ
only by path) then they must have the same secretName. This is because
it wouldn't make sense for there to be two different TLS certificates
for one host. Find any that do not have the same secret name to
put an error status on them and to avoid serving OIDC endpoints for
them. The host comparison is case-insensitive.
- Issuer hostnames should be treated as case-insensitive, because
DNS hostnames are case-insensitive. So https://me.com and
https://mE.cOm are duplicate issuers. However, paths are
case-sensitive, so https://me.com/A and https://me.com/a are
different issuers. Fixed this in the issuer validations and in the
OIDC Manager's request router logic.
